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CRIMINAL LAW-THE GENERAL PART. By Glanville L.
Williams. London: Stephens & Sons, Ltd., 1953. Pp. xliv, 736.

$8.82.
Glanville Williams, Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of
London, has written a book about the "general principles" of the criminal
law, i.e., those ideas that seem to permeate or underlie penal legislation
and decision. Specific offenses, like rape, larceny or arson, are to be the
subject of a later volume, which will be eagerly awaited by those who read
this one. Here Professor Williams deals with such pervasive notions as
mens rea (intention, motive, recdessness, negligence), the effect of mistake
or mental abnormality, responsibility for the misconduct of others, criminal
liability for acts which fall short of inflicting harm (attempts and conspiracy), and justification or excuse for behavior that would normally be
punishable.
In undertaking to expound general principles, the author does not offer
a set of immutable first premises from which all rules of criminal liability
are deduced. His is an inductive approach which looks at particular cases
to see whether they do in fact fall into patterns that can be expressed in
general principles. Particular decisions are not approved or disapproved
simply because they can or cannot be reconciled with an acceptable generalization, but by reference to all relevant considerations of public policy.
The range of discussion covers everything that a good teacher of criminal
law would like to impart to his students: the landmark decisions and major
legislative provisions, the views of leading commentators, data and arguments drawn from the social sciences. The reader is left finally not with
a pat, deceptively certain rule, but with the realization that society must go
on making difficult decisions on inadequate data. General principles of law
are not a substitute for wit and judgment in the legislature or on the bench.
The book opens with the classic analysis of criminal behavior as composed of two elements, the forbidden act (actus reus) and the guilty mind
(mens rea). We are warned at once that the distinction is not as well
defined as the words would suggest. There is, for example, a mental component in "act." A sleepwalker does not "act." Drunks and persons under hypnosis are to be regarded as acting, but may in some situations escape
liability by showing lack of mns rea. A lunatic does "act" even though
he may be acquitted on the grounds of irresponsibility: "An act presupposes
will, but not free will." Act is not to be understood as denoting a particular
muscular movement, but extends to the whole context, i.e., it is not the
contraction of the trigger finger which is the "act" but that movement in
relation to the trigger of a loaded gun which is pointed at a human being.
(573)
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In any event, an "act" is not always necessary to liability, notably where
failure to act is made punishable. If all this sounds metaphysical the blame
must be laid not at Professor Williams' door, but upon the primitive state
of Anglo-American penal law which has never developed a conscious or
consistent theory of responsibility or culpability. As I shall point out later
the resulting confusion has led even Professor Williams into occasional
error.
The author opens his discussion of mens rea with a brief review of the
evolution of the distinction between advertent and inadvertent evildoing.
It is recognized that guilt should ordinarily be conscious guilt since threat of
punishment cannot deter a person who is unaware that he is engaged in
wrongdoing. Professor Williams discerns and defines three distinct attitudes embraced within the generic term mens rea: intent, recklessness
and gross negligence. Intent covers primarily the situations where the
actor desires to bring about the result that the law is designed to prevent;
but the term also covers cases where the actor knows that the forbidden
result will certainly ensue even though he does not desire that result for its
own sake. Thus defined, intent excludes "motive," that is, consequences
beyond those significant for the crime. A man who purposely shoots his
grandmother in order to inherit under her will has the requisite attitude
for murder even though his dominant or ultimate objective was not his
grandmother's death but the acquisition of her wealth, or, it may be, the use
of that wealth to pay for vital medical care for his wife. The wide sweep
of Williams' inquiry can be seen from the consideration he gives even
to "unconscious desire," as in the case of a feeble-minded servant girl who
persistently, but without conscious purpose, breaks her mistress' china in
order to escape from domestic service. Recklessness is differentiated from
intent by the fact that there is no desire or foreseen certainty of the forbidden result, but recklessness does require an actual subjective awareness that one is creating an unjustifiably high risk. Finally, gross negligence as the basis of criminal liability is egregious carelessness by a person
who should be but is not aware of the unjustifiable risk he creates.
With his terms now carefully defined Professor Williams moves on to
consider with characteristic wit and common sense what the substantive law
ought to be. Perhaps the greatest problem with which he comes to grips
is that of the relation between mental illness and criminal responsibility.
Crisply he reminds medical critics of what they so often seem to forget,
namely that the existing legal tests of criminal responsibility, defective and
vulnerable though they be, do not purport to define insanity-a medical
entity-but only to draw a workable line of differentiation between those
mentally ill persons who are amenable to deterrents and those who are not.
The unfortunate phrases "legal definition of insanity" or " legally insane,"
which have so often misled our psychiatric brethren, even slip into the
author's discussion; but he never loses sight of the real problem which is to
define responsibility, not mental illness. Williams is no defender of the
McNaughton rules, under which an insane person can be held responsible
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if he knows that he is misbehaving, however incapable he is of behaving
otherwise. He wants the rules changed or abandoned, not merely made
tolerable by evasions of one sort or another that have been developing in the
administration of the rules. So also he rejects attempts to palliate the
continued use of McNaughton's rules in trials merely because broader concepts of irresponsibility apparently govern the exercise of executive clemency by the Home Office. At this point appears one of those astringent
observations that make the book a delight to the literary palate as well as
a feast of reason:
"It may be that the present scheme of things, under which the executive in effect sets aside the verdict of the jury, is due not merely to the
national habit of avoiding fresh legislation but to the veneration of the
jury, which prevents that body being openly superseded while permitting it to be covertly undermined."
Professor Williams goes along with the proposal of the majority of the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment' authorizing a jury to acquit in
case of mental illness "of such a degree that the accused ought not to be
held responsible." 2 This hardly seems an adequate guide for juries in the
discharge of their responsibilities in what are usually capital cases. Without knowing more than I do about the behavior of English juries one cannot be sure how the formula will work there. But certainly in this country
we would anticipate that many extraneous factors would enter into an
American jury's determination of the degree of mental illness which "ought"
to absolve the accused. In most cases the atrocity of the offense would be
balanced against the apparent extent of the illness, so that perpetrators of
gruesome murders may be sentenced to death although quite insane. In
other cases a particular jury influenced by some amateur psychiatrist in its
membership, or by an impassioned argument of counsel, may accept the
view that no "disturbed" or "abnormal" personality ought to be held responsible. Surely the community should be able to express its standards
more precisely than this, when life is at stake.
One of the most interesting phases of the analysis of criminal responsibility of mentally abnormal people is Professor Williams' sharp criticism
of the rule that permits acquittal of a man whose insane mistake of fact
negatives the guilty state of mind ordinarily prescribed for the offense. For
example, a man breaks into a house under the insane delusion that it contains stolen crown jewels which he has been deputized to recover for Her
Majesty. Williams would have him convicted of burglary (since he committed the "actus reus"), but with the usual special verdict of insanity, so
that the man is committed to Broadmoor rather than prison.3 A culprit
1. Command Paper 8932 of 1953.
2. Compare State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871) ("the verdict should be
not guilty by reason of insanity, if the killing was the offspring or product of mental
disease"); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
3. Williams points out (p. 299) that the British special verdict, "guilty of the
act . . . but insane at the time" replaced the earlier formula of "not guilty on the
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who breaks into other people's houses under insane delusions is, he argues,
more dangerous than one who makes a sane mistake. He should, therefore, not go at large. A verdict of guilty but insane appears to provide the
desirable solution. Going even further, Professor Williams would permit
the prosecution to introduce evidence of insanity for the very purpose of
arriving at a verdict of guilty but insane, in a case where the defense might
prefer to exclude evidence of insanity in the hope of exculpating the accused
on the basis of having made a sane and reasonable mistake of fact. Professor Williams' view would appear to be justified only if commitment procedures are inadequate to assure detention of the dangerously insane; but
to espouse his view on this ground is to engage in the very sort of evasive
indirect compensation for legislative deficiencies that he usually deplores.
The author's position at this point is diametrically opposed to that of
our own Professor Keedy who would give effect to insanity as a defense
only where it negatives the mens rea ordinarily prescribed for the offense.4
I find myself in between. Professor Williams' desire to confine dangerous
lunatics is understandable but, in my opinion, should be accomplished
through civil commitment rather than criminal conviction. On the other
hand, a rule that insanity exculpates only when it negatives the nens rea
seem to me in part circular (What is the mens rea requirement insofar as
sanity is concerned?) and in part unduly restrictive. Insanity sometimes
manifests itself in exaggerated emphasis of the very state of mind normally
required for guilt. Thus, the kleptomaniac may be distinguished from
people of ordinary mental health principally by his overwhelming need to
steal; likewise the pyromaniac and the paranoiac killer who slays in revenge
for an imaginary slight.
To my mind, mental health should be treated almost like a jurisdictional fact in criminal proceedings, rather than as an element of guilt. The
penal law and the criminal courts were designed to deal with the great bulk
of the population composed of individuals who with all their foibles and
complexes still guide their conduct according to more or less understandable
objectives and fears, including the fear of the law. An individual who falls
outside this group is the proper and exclusive concern of the doctors, not
the lawyers. This jurisdictional line could not have been observed in ages
past when the fornicator, the thief, and the manic-depressive psychotic
might equally be regarded as possessed of the devil, when the line between
ecclesiastical and secular power was less sharply drawn, and when detention facilities and treatment techniques were primitive and undifferentiated.
In our day the line between the two jurisdictions can be drawn a little more
precisely, although not so precisely as some may suppose.
Many consequences would follow acceptance of the jurisdictional approach to the problem of criminal responsibility. Responsibility would be
ground of insanity" at the instance of Queen Victoria, who was shot at by a man
afterwards acquitted on the ground of insanity. The Queen asserted he must have
been guilty because she saw him fire the pistol herself. Williams therefore regards
the special verdict as equivalent to acquittal.
4. Keedy, Insanity and Csininal Responsibility, 30 HAv. L. Ray. 535 (1917).

1955]

BOOK REVIEW

divorced from notions of guilt and innocence. Neither conviction nor acquittal would be appropriate disposition of the plea of insanity. The issue
of responsibility would be raised on preliminary motion and decided by the
court upon advice of psychiatrists. Rules of evidence and burden of proof
would differ from those that prevail in a criminal trial. When irresponsibility due to mental illness was established the criminal court would be
ousted of jurisdiction. If not established, the trial would proceed with only
such evidence as bears on the essential elements of the offense, including
intent to steal, burn, kill, as the case may be, but without the almost metaphysical inquiry whether the defendant could prevent himself from intending these things. We are so accustomed to confusing the question of guilt
with that of responsibility that some may feel doubt as to the constitutionality of any attempt to take the issue of responsibility away from the
jury.5 But even now our law shows traces of recognition of the distinction. Thus the burden of proof is often put on the defendant to establish
insanity. Or the jury may be instructed to accept the defense only if the
evidence establishes that as a result of the disease the defendant was
incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of his conduct; such a charge permits conviction if the jury believes that the accused was capableof knowing,
even if in fact he did not know. 6 Without approving these rules in the
setting of existing law, it seems to me that they suggest the possibility of
constitutionally taking the issue of responsibility away from the jury
entirely.
To admire Professor Williams very much is not, of course, to admire
all parts of his work equally. For example, it seems to me that he goes
astray in discussing the Dadson case in the course of his exposition of the
requirement of "actus reus." Dadson fired at a man he caught stealing
wood. The theft would ordinarily be and was, so far as Dadson knew,
a misdemeanor, so that it would not be lawful to shoot to effect an arrest.
However, it turned out that this was a third offense by this culprit, and
therefore a felony. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved affirmed Dadson's
conviction for unlawful shooting. Williams, arguing from the general requirement of a wrongful act, says that the situation was objectively innocent,
since the thief was in fact a felon and Dadson was entitled to shoot although
he did not know it. He concludes that the conviction should have been
reversed without inquiry into Dadson's mental state, and adds as a clincher
a hypothetical case of a sheriff killing a man for private reasons, when, unknown to the sheriff, a warrant had been issued to him authorizing execution of the victim. Our author finds it preposterous that such a sheriff
should be proceeded against as a murderer. I should say that Dadson was
a man dangerously given to shooting with inadequate provocation and the
sheriff a murderously inclined individual. Both carried out their propensities in a fashion justifiable only by express sanction of the community.
As for actus reus, one need only consult Professor Williams' fascinating
5. See Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931).
6. State v. Cordasco, 2 N.J. 189, 66 A.2d 27 (1949).
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account of the law of attempt, where he has no difficulty punishing for attempted theft a man who carries off his own umbrella believing that it belongs to another:
"The only actus reus that is invariably required in criminal law is
an act that either furthers the intention of the accused or, at least, is
thought by him to further it

.

.

..

Getting away from dialectics, it

is said in favour of the narrower construction of the law that one who
attempts to murder with sugar, thinking that it is arsenic, ought not
to be held guilty of an attempt because 'there is no danger to the
public.' The short answer to this is that there is danger to the public
in leaving uncorrected a man who is bent on murder." (p. 497).
The Dadson discussion is one of the very few instances in which Professor
Williams permits dialectics to govern decision. This lapse was for me
rendered even more unfortunate by dragging into the discussion the American rule excluding evidence derived from an unlawful arrest. Professor
Williams seems to think this rule also derives from inadequate attention to
actus reus: the criminal did his evil deed and should not escape merely
because others have also misbehaved. The rule of exclusion, followed in
our federal and in many state courts, whether right or wrong, rests on
notions of public policy. Many in this country believe that the only effective way of preventing American police from making illegal arrests and
searches is to deny them the benefit of any successes they achieve by these
means.

The limits of a review make it impossible to do justice to subtleties of
thought and style, to stimulating and often amusing illustration, and to the
remarkable range of the author's learning. American cases and commentators are drawn on freely (Holmes, Jerome Hall, Michael and Wechsler).
Even more remarkable is the use made of nonlegal sources. On the degree
of probability which makes for recklessness Williams summons as witnesses
Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: Its Nature and Limits) and
Ramsey (The Foundation of Mathematics). Freud, Kinberg, Goodwin
and other psychologists and psychiatrists speak to the psychic components
of nsens rea.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Professor Williams' solution of
every problem he considers, it will henceforth constitute gross negligence
if not recklessness for law student, lawyer, legislator, teacher or judge to
fail to consult him.
Louis B. Schwartz t
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

